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This paper compares the social networks that are mobilised through claims of owner-
ship in property regimes and transaction regimes.1 I use the categories of ‘property’
and ‘transaction’ to denote the differences between exchange practices that emphasise
relationships between persons and things (property) in contrast to relationships cre-
ated between persons through the circulation of things (transactions). This distinction
attends to the social networks that are formed as a consequence of exchange, provid-
ing an alternative to the opposition between gifts and commodities (e.g. Gregory
1982). Critics of this dichotomy have objected to its application to entire societies,
citing the complementarity of the two modes of exchange within societies (Carrier
1995: viii). Other critics have examined the processes through which gifts can be con-
verted into commodities and vice-versa, resulting in arguments about the ‘commodity
potential’ of all things (Appadurai 1988: 13). In contrast, I am interested in the social
consequences of different modes of exchange. Not all exchange practices, for example,
contribute to the ‘reproduction of the social and cosmic order’, as Bloch and Parry
(1991: 2; see also Weiner 1980) have argued. The distinction between property and
transaction regimes emphasises the social networks associated with different strategies
of ownership, rather than the status of particular objects as gifts or commodities. 
I examine these differences in relation to compensation claims for damage and
destruction to property that have been levied against the Lihir gold mine in Papua
Social Anthropology (2001), 9, 2, 147–163. © 2001 European Association of Social Anthropologists 147
1 Support for this research was provided by the Center for International Business Education at the
University of Michigan and the UK Economic and Social Research Council in association with the
‘Property, Transactions and Creativity’ project directed by Marilyn Strathern and Eric Hirsch. I
thank Martin Paining and Leonard Lagisa for their assistance on Lihir, as well as the people who
participated in interviews there. I am particularly grateful to Martha Macintyre for generously
sharing insights drawn from applied research on Lihir, and for permission to cite her unpublished
work. A related paper discussing these examples previously appeared as ‘Keeping the network in
view. Compensation, property and social relations in Melanesia’, in L. Kalinoe and J. Leach (eds.),
Rationales of ownership, New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors Ltd. and Port Moresby: Law
Faculty Publication Unit, University of Papua New Guinea, 2001. That volume considers the
implications of different strategies of ownership for policy and legislation on cultural and intellec-
tual property rights in Papua New Guinea. Thanks are also due to Tony Crook, Eric Hirsch, James
Leach, Marilyn Strathern, Michael Wood and the two anonymous reviewers for Social
Anthropology for their valuable comments, suggestions and criticisms. Any errors of fact or
interpretation are solely my responsibility. 
New Guinea.2 I focus on the difference between Lihirian ideas about property,
exchange and social networks, and those enshrined in Euro-American business prac-
tices. In the Euro-American examples, ownership strategies promote rights on the
basis of exclusion, limiting alternative claims to property (Strathern 1996). In contrast,
Lihirian claims generally seek to bring longer social networks into view, expanding the
possibilities for participation. I also suggest that disputes between the mine and
Lihirians regarding compensation claims are related in part to the tension between the
two regimes of exchange. Lihirians participate in a divided economy in which social
reproduction through mortuary exchange is carried out through transactions which
emphasise social relations. One of the challenges faced by Lihirians is how to perpet-
uate local ways of establishing value and reproducing social relationships while fully
participating in the cash economy associated with the mine. 
Proper ty ef fects 
The objective of this paper is to assess how different strategies of ownership affect
other social categories and practices. This question was recently raised by William
Pietz (1997: 98) in an essay that addressed the ‘sweeping transformation in British
social institutions of the 1840s that established legal structures better suited to capital-
ist enterprise and liberal society’. His focus was the abolition of the legal principle of
the deodand, which held that an object that causes a person’s death, such as a farm
animal that tramples a neighbour, the knife used to commit a murder, or more signifi-
cantly for this paper, the locomotive that kills an individual crossing the railway
tracks, must be forfeited to the sovereign. The emergence of railways as nineteenth-
century economic powers, Pietz argued, prompted re-evaluation of both the laws per-
taining to the deodand and the broader question of how to calculate the value of
compensation owed for the loss of human life. Railways could not afford to risk for-
feiture of their engines or payment of the equivalent value in cash; the principle of the
deodand jeopardised the industry and its multiplier effects on agriculture and textile
production. Legal reforms were contingent on formulating a new means of calculating
the value that would be paid in compensation for fatal accidents. Whereas the deodand
established a value for compensation based on the worth of the material object that
was instrumental in causing the death, rescinding this principle prompted a shift to the
evaluation of what had been lost, establishing an economic value for human life. Pietz
revealed the connections between new technologies, new kinds of property claims (in
compensation for the loss of life) and new social categories (the creation of a money
value for human life). New forms of property may alter fundamental social categories,
including how one imagines life itself. 
Whereas Pietz examined an historical turning point in British definitions of prop-
erty and persons, this paper focuses on the conjunction of two different systems for
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organising claims of ownership. In both the essay by Pietz and the examples from
Lihir, however, the paired contrasts (before/after in the historical analysis and the dif-
ferences between societies in the following ethnographic discussion) make explicit the
relationship between strategies of ownership and other social categories. This paper
also examines the implications of introducing new forms of technology (mines, roads,
vehicles) that have prompted compensation claims by Lihirians. Whereas Pietz
described legal reforms that favoured the interests of capital, this paper examines con-
tinued assertions of difference despite efforts by the mine to rationalise its relation-
ships with Lihirians according to Euro-American concepts of property and propriety.
The networks mobilised by their respective claims also influence how the two parties
view the environmental impact of the mine, suggesting an underlying symmetry
between Euro-American property models and scientific practice. 
Compensation on Lihir
I present three cases that examine relations between the Lihir gold mine and local
communities on Lihir, east of New Ireland.3 Two of these examples address compen-
sation claims against the mine for the loss of pigs.4 In the first case, the death of a
number of pigs from Putput village was initially attributed to pollution from the mine.
Scientific investigation eventually refuted this claim, but compensation payments were
made after the mine acknowledged a complex chain of events that linked its actions to
the death of the pigs. The second example is concerned with pigs killed by vehicles on
a road built by the mining company. It illustrates how both Lihirians and miners
manipulate social networks to their own advantage, demonstrating the flexibility that
exists in the application of different strategies of ownership. The final case examines
values for pigs in ritual exchange that appear to be ‘irrational’ or non-economic unless
one takes into account the social networks that are referenced by these transactions.
How do the social networks associated with property regimes (the Euro-American
examples) differ from those associated with transaction regimes (the Lihirian
examples)? How are the resulting networks exploited by the two parties? I also con-
sider the relationship between these social networks and the ways in which the respec-
tive parties view environmental issues associated with the mine. 
Although compensation claims made against mining companies may appear
initially to be an unusual context for examining how ownership claims are formulated
in Melanesia, they have two distinct advantages. First, the examples provide access to
both Euro-American and Lihirian ways of viewing social networks in the same milieu,
facilitating comparison between the two. Second, negotiations between the miners
(both expatriate and Melanesian) and local communities provide explicit commentary
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3 The Lihir group of islands (Niolam, Malie, Masahet and Mahur) is located off the east coast of New
Ireland, between Tabar and Tanga. 
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package that addressed compensation for impact, relocation and infrastructure development,
environmental monitoring and rehabilitation (Banks 1998: 61–2). Payments to landowners are pro-
portionate to the level of impact from the mine, including damage to hot springs, dust from
company vehicles, discolouration of sea water, impact on local fauna and the destruction of sacred
sites and graves. Landowners receive royalty payments in addition to any dividends from their
shares in the mine. Industry observers have described the agreement as ‘the benchmark within
Papua New Guinea for such arrangements’ (Banks 1998: 62). 
on their respective differences. Lihirians have had to adjust to the new world created
around the mine and in each of the following examples, they accomplish this in part
by revealing connections to wider social networks.5 
Pig deaths at Putput 
In late 1999, Samuel Venge6 from Putput village in Lihir presented a compensation
claim to the Lihir Management Company (henceforth, the Lihir mine), which oper-
ates the gold mine at Lihir. 7 Venge sought compensation for the death of two pigs he
was raising in the village, which includes property adjacent to the mine. In the heat of
the afternoon, the pigs took refuge in Labarai creek, which runs behind the process-
ing plant at the mine. Venge suggested that the animals drank from the creek. Given
that run-off from the mine facility enters Labarai creek, Venge suspected that pol-
lution from the mine killed his pigs and asked for compensation from the Lihir mine,
holding it responsible for his loss.8 
The mine’s manager for external relations, James Makon,9 responded swiftly to
Venge’s claim. Makon, who is from New Ireland, previously directed community
relations at the Ok Tedi mine, where communication between the mine and down-
stream communities has long been dominated by mistrust. That mine claimed to pro-
tect the environment, while creating one of the worst ecological disasters in the region
(Hyndman 1994; Kirsch 1997a).10 Makon’s experiences at Ok Tedi encouraged him to
expedite the response of the Lihir mine in order to allay any suspicions that the
company had something to hide. He spoke directly with Venge, negotiating the terms
of the compensation, and authorised payment of K2,200, a rather large sum for two
pigs by Papua New Guinea standards. 
Before the year’s end, however, a representative from the Lihir Mining Area
Landowners Association (henceforth, landowners association) presented claims to the
mine from 21 landowners regarding the recent deaths of an additional 22 pigs. What
caused the mysterious demise of the pigs at Putput? Did toxic chemicals from the pro-
cessing plant poison the animals? Was the mine responsible for the decimation of the
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5 Writing about agency and liability in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, Strathern and Stewart
(2000: 92) emphasised the importance of ‘chains of interpersonal events’ in the explanation of acci-
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6 A pseudonym.
7 According to Rio Tinto (1997: 25): ‘With reserves containing more than 13 million ounces of recov-
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landowners from Putput village near the Lihir gold mine temporarily shut operations at the open
pit’ because of concerns about gas leaking from equipment at the mine (Post Courier of Papua New
Guinea, 1998). According to the Post Courier, the acting managing director for the mine said: “The
landowners had general concerns on the environmental impact of the operations. We were able to
allay their fears and we undertook to provide them with outside expert advise” (on the environ-
mental impacts of the plant)’. 
9 A pseudonym.
10 For example, a public relations poster produced by the Ok Tedi mine in the early 1990s asserted
that ‘Kampani lukautim wara, bus, na abus’ [‘The company protects the rivers, forests and
wildlife’]. 
Putput pig herds? Should it compensate the owners, particularly given the precedent
established by Makon with respect to Venge’s pigs? 
Early in the new year, a representative of the mine composed a memo which
described his meeting with the villagers of Putput, who ‘agreed that compensation is
not the [sole] solution to their demands. We must identify [the] cause [of the pig
deaths] and inform the community’. In the interim, villagers from Putput requested
that a fence be constructed around the plant site to keep their remaining pigs away
from Labarai creek. As another mine employee related in a separate memo, ‘If we can
block it [access to mine property] off . . . then we will solve the problem. Their pigs can
die on their own side of the fence’.
Shortly thereafter, the Lihir mine formally asked the PNG National Agriculture
Quarantine and Inspection Authority to investigate the Putput pig mortalities. Dr
Thompson, the Regional Veterinary Officer, Momase and Islands regions, arrived in
Lihir two days later. He conducted ante- and post-mortem examinations of an affec-
ted pig and recorded his observations on local pig husbandry. Thompson’s research
(2000: 11) suggested that the pig deaths were the result of ‘the combination of over-
population of free-ranging pigs, inadequate nutrition and severe contamination by
internal parasites’, rather than pollution from the mine, although he identified elevated
levels of lead and arsenic in the run-off from the processing plant. Thompson (2000:
12) recommended that Labarai creek be diverted away from Putput village, suggesting
that otherwise it would remain a ‘cause of concern and possible basis for compensa-
tion claims’.
Whereas Thompson absolved the mine from direct responsibility for the pig
deaths, the residents of Putput rejected the mine’s attempt to limit the issue to a sim-
plified or shortened causal hypothesis, i.e. whether or not the pigs died as a result of
exposure to toxic chemicals contained in the run-off from the processing plant. They
argued that the mine owed them compensation for their pigs because the problems
were the result of changes associated with mining on Lihir. To underscore their claim,
the landowners threatened to close down the mine if compensation for their losses
were not forthcoming. 
Several months later an agreement was reached between the mine and the local
community. The mine agreed to compensate the pig owners for outstanding claims. It
also proposed to help remedy the conditions responsible for the porcine mortalities.
What rationale did the mine present as the basis for its decision? A lengthy series of
events linked the mine to the death of the pigs. Construction of the mine forced the
people of Putput village to relocate. Their new land lacked sufficient resources to ade-
quately feed and support the number of pigs that they owned. This resulted in ‘severe
malnutrition and worms infestation due to improper feeding and unhygienic con-
dition[s] . . . which the pigs encountered while in search of food’, according to a memo
written by a member of the mine’s agricultural staff. While the mine was initially
reluctant to compensate the people of Putput for their losses, pressure from the
landowners forced the mine to address the complex chain of events through which it
was connected to the pig deaths, leading it to accept partial liability for the losses of
the people of Putput. 
In a draft of the settlement agreement between the mine and the pig owners, this
was expressed as: ‘LMC [Lihir Management Company] and the community of Putput
. . . acknowledge that all parties must share the blame for the problem . . .’ The docu-
ment included commitments from the mine to pay K17,640 in compensation for the
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lost pigs, institute a vaccination programme as recommended by veterinary auth-
orities, conduct an educational programme regarding the care and feeding of pigs for
the people of Putput village and undertake other actions in support of local pig hus-
bandry as appropriate, including the monitoring of their health status until the current
problems have abated.
That negotiations between the two parties took place under the threat of mine
closure suggests that the events might be treated as a political contest. There is no
doubt that the people of Lihir manoeuvre for favourable terms vis-à-vis the mine. But
the question here is whether the two parties view compensation claims in the same
way. Whereas the mine initially regarded the events in relatively narrow terms, focused
on scientific evidence that failed to reveal a direct connection between the mine and
the death of the pigs at Putput, the villagers rejected this view. They were able to force
the mine to acknowledge its implication in a wider chain of events which had unin-
tended and unfortunate consequences for the people of Putput. 
Networks and ownership
It is instructive to consider this example in relation to a pair of essays by Marilyn
Strathern (1996, 1998) on networks and property, which were written in response to
Bruno Latour’s (1993) We have never been modern. Latour argued that one of the dis-
tinguishing features of modern networks is their scale. Consumers and commodities
are linked by economic relationships that encircle the globe; information technologies
communicate ideas around the world effortlessly and instantaneously. In contrast to
the expansionist tendencies of modern networks, Latour claimed that ‘non-modern’
social networks are limited in length. Strathern has questioned Latour’s conclusions,
suggesting that he neglected important differences in how societies construct social
networks, especially the way in which Euro-American property claims reduce their
length. 
The compensation claims examined in this paper might be compared to patents or
copyrights insofar as they all make statements about the ownership of things and/or
ideas. In seeking to license scientific discoveries, claims to ownership are based on
novel contributions to the invention in question, while ignoring pre-existing networks
(the other scientists who have conducted research on the subject, but are excluded
from the application for the patent).11 A patent thus restricts ownership (and profit) to
the final segment of the network, neglecting the other contributors. Strathern (1996)
described this process as ‘cutting the network’ and argued that Euro-American models
of ownership operate by limiting the number of claimants to property. So whereas
Latour described the propensity of modern networks to grow large, there is an
important caveat to his observation, that Euro-Americans shorten these networks
when they establish claims of ownership. 
In contrast, social networks in Melanesia typically include all of those persons
152 STUART  K IRSCH
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who have contributed to another’s success, each of whom may later lay claim to their
share of what that person attracts in the transactions in which he or she participates.
Whereas these networks may not expand to the physical scale of their Euro-American
counterparts, claims of ownership are partial, multiple and overlapping, and thus do
not necessarily reduce their overall length by restricting participation.12 Threats of
sorcery, for example, which target persons who refuse to acknowledge their debts to
others, can be seen to mitigate against the shortening of Melanesian networks. 
These examples complicate Latour’s arguments about the scale of networks. Both
approaches to networks – of reducing their length in Euro-American property claims
and of addressing a broader set of social relations in Melanesian compensation claims
– are evident in the dispute over the pig deaths at Putput and the mine’s response to
the community. On the one hand, the mine originally viewed the problem solely in
terms of limiting corporate obligations to local communities. No compensation was
necessary because pollution from the mine did not kill the pigs. On the other hand,
pressure from Lihirians forced the mine to acknowledge its involvement in the lengthy
chain of events that led to the problems at Putput. The mine’s initial response was to
shorten the network, while the Lihirians brought the larger social network into view. 
Science, networks and compensation claims
A central issue in disputes between mining companies and affected communities in
Papua New Guinea is the association of science, like ownership, with shortened net-
works. Mining companies often use science to frame problems so that they relate
directly to a ‘natural world’ that exists independently of social relations (see
McEachern 1995). In response, landowners affected by mining companies have chal-
lenged the exclusivity of the resulting explanations, providing alternative perspectives
which take social relations into account.13 
In several cases, communities living downstream from large-scale mining projects
have charged these mines with responsibility for problems that would otherwise have
been attributed to sorcery or witchcraft. The Yonggom living downstream from Ok
Tedi view the mine as a kind of corporate sorcerer because, like a sorcerer, it acts irra-
tionally, behaves in an antisocial manner and endangers its neighbours (Kirsch 1997a).
Their compensation claims against the mine have addressed a variety of misfortunes –
including an injured finger, a broken bone and a drowning after a canoe overturned –
that implicate the mine in social relations downstream. Yonggom sorcery accusations
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tural production of a new kind of transhuman person (a corporation is a person in the eyes of the
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13 Disputes over the interpretation of the environmental impact of mining were critical factors in the
onset of civil war on Bougainville (Connell 1991) and the legal battle over the Ok Tedi mine
(Kirsch 1997b). 
critique the political economy of mining by framing compensation claims against the
mine in terms drawn from the local moral economy. 
Downstream from the Porgera mine in the southern Highlands, similar claims
about sorcery have emerged (Haley n.d.).14 The assertions were initially limited to the
deaths of a number of pigs thought to have consumed polluted river water. The deaths
were blamed on ‘poison’, or sorcery, leading to the equation of pollution and poison,
and of environmental impacts and sorcery more generally. The analogy was later
broadened to include human fatalities, so that a number of deaths previously attrib-
uted to sorcery via ‘poison’ were retrospectively explained by pollution released into
the river by the mine. 
In both examples, the local communities attribute a range of problems to the
effects of mining. In contrast, the mining companies look primarily to scientific evi-
dence to evaluate their impact on the environment (and people) downstream.
Environmental issues are amenable to positivist, empirical inquiry. Either it can be
demonstrated that the mine has caused a particular problem, for example that run-off
from the processing plant at Lihir killed the pigs at Putput, or the mine is absolved of
responsibility. But neither questions about compensation claims for pig deaths at Lihir
nor overturned canoes on the Ok Tedi river can be fully answered by science. The
tendency for Euro-Americans to view environmental issues independently of social
relations follows what Latour (1993:10–12) has identified as the modernist emphasis
on the separation of categories (e.g. nature/culture, science/politics).15 Melanesians,
however, are more apt to treat what Euro-Americans call the ‘environment’ as a
hybrid, a combination of social relations and things in the world, in part a human cre-
ation, rather than an independent condition (e.g. the ‘organic’). 
These examples suggest that some forms of science may be predicated in part on
the same strategy that establishes ownership in property regimes, of cutting the net-
work. Latour has emphasised the hybrid nature of modern networks, their ability to
combine persons, things and ideas (e.g. scientists, arguments about global warming
and refrigerator coolant) into a single chain. Yet when the scope of scientific inquiry
is restricted, it cannot resolve problems that are hybrid in composition. In contrast, an
emphasis on broader social networks may bring other issues into view. 
Lihir road kil l
When mining company vehicles kill domesticated pigs, which forage and move along
the road that encircles the island, Lihirians demand compensation. A method for deal-
ing with these circumstances is in place. A corporate representative is sent to negotiate
with the owner of the animal, paying as much as K1,000 per pig. The rate varies
according to the original investment (some animals are now brought from Rabaul and
New Ireland by sea, at considerable expense), market value (based on size and matu-
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14 Andrew Strathern (1997:7) observed that ‘deaths [among Duna speaking people along the
Strickland River] attributed to witchcraft in 1991 were diagnosed as caused by pollution in 1994,
following visits by a loiya (lawyer)’. Stewart and Strathern (1997: 24, n.70) added that these deaths
‘were now being traced to pollution from the Strickland river which had been running red from
the discharge of oxides used in the gold mining process at the Porgera mine in the Enga Province’. 
15 Latour (1993: 11) argued that modernist discourse ‘establish[es] a partition between a natural world
that has always been there, a society with predictable and stable interests and stakes, and a dis-
course that is independent of both reference and society’. 
rity at death) and projected value at maturity (if not fully adult). These principles are
not necessarily applied with consistency; social factors (the identity of the driver and
the owners of the vehicle and the pig) and other details of the accident may influence
the amount paid in compensation. 
A view expressed by some parties at the mine (both Melanesian and expatriate) is
that compensation demands for pigs killed in road accidents are manipulated by
Lihirians to extract additional funds from the mine, which is compelled to respond in
order to maintain working relationships with surrounding communities. This position
is supported by the observation that Lihirians seek compensation from the company
for all pigs killed by motor vehicles on the road, even when they are not owned by the
mine or driven by one of its employees. Lihirians claim that the mine is responsible for
all vehicular accidents because it built the road, even though Lihirians requested its
construction.
The underlying principle of liability has parallels elsewhere in Melanesia. David
Akin (1999: 59) has described its invocation in the Solomon Islands, both in rural con-
texts in which the sponsors of feasts are ‘liable for misfortune befalling those who
attend social events they create’ and in urban areas in which ‘the government is liable
for trouble that occurs . . . because the town is a government creation’. In each of these
examples – the mine held accountable for accidents along the road, the sponsor of a
feast for mishaps and the government for urban crime and conflict – social networks
link specific losses to the person(s) or agent(s) responsible for the context (the road,
the feast, the town) in which the events occurred, regardless of their separation in time
or the actions of other agents in the interim. In all of these claims, social networks are
stretched to their logical limits. 
Despite holding the mine responsible for all of the accidents along the road,
Lihirians themselves are critical of the mine’s practice of paying compensation on
behalf of its employees. The landowner association argues that the driver of the vehi-
cle involved in an accident, rather than the mine, should compensate the owner of the
pig. They suggest that holding the drivers personally accountable would reduce the
number of accidents.
Gender is also a factor in compensation claims and payments. Macintyre (2000)
observed that compensation claims are always made by individual men, even though
pigs are either the property of families (with multiple ownership crossing gender lines)
or individuals, with women having rights to an equivalent number of pigs as men. The
money gained through compensation claims is also individually controlled and con-
sumed, rather than circulated or re-invested. Women are typically denied access to
these funds, even when they were directly responsible for the care and feeding of the
pigs. Social networks associated with compensation claims may contract along gender
lines when their losses are converted into cash. 
These examples illustrate that Lihirians are not limited to a single strategy vis-à-
vis social networks when making compensation claims. They argue that the mine is
responsible for all of the pigs killed along the road, construing the network as broadly
as possible (while presumably avoiding negotiations with fellow Lihirians, along with
the networks that they might activate). Yet when they assign individual responsibility
to drivers for accidents, they reduce the network to its shortest possible configuration.
The Lihir mine, it might be added, also employs both strategies: shortening the net-
work to reject responsibility for accidents which do not include either company vehi-
cles or personnel, while lengthening the network to assume responsibility for all
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claims against its employees. These are strategic decisions; miners and Lihirians alike
may either shorten or lengthen social networks according to the circumstances and
their objectives. 
Compensation
A key element of compensation claims against Lihir is the threat of mine closure.
Colin Filer (1997: 176) described how an executive at the mine once considered pur-
chasing large quantities of shell valuables for the company to distribute at local mor-
tuary feasts, although the plan was never implemented, perhaps because it would
have involved the mine too closely in local affairs. Yet the mine has granted con-
siderable power to the local practice of gorgor, the Tok Pisin name for a plant used
to demarcate taboo zones (e.g. gardens, an unoccupied house or one’s hunting
grounds) in which people are forbidden to trespass. Tying gorgor to the gates of the
Lihir mine stops production because its employees not only understand but also
obey the message. By respecting this local signal the mine also legitimises the under-
lying claim that its operation is contingent on the continued goodwill of the local
community.
Compensation claims are deployed throughout Melanesia to express concerns
about a variety of political, economic and environmental concerns. Rural communities
use the threat of disruption or violence to establish a forum external to formal politi-
cal channels through which they can negotiate on their own behalf.16 Whereas com-
pensation demands expand the possibilities for local participation, they undermine the
authority of the state to regulate and distribute resources (Filer 1997). That the state is
unable to prevent landowners from exercising veto power over resource developers is
one of the lessons that can be drawn from the decade of civil war that followed the
forced closure of the Panguna mine on Bougainville by local residents (Filer 1990).17
Without a mutually-recognisable signal like the gorgor, relationships between resource
developers and affected communities may deteriorate quickly, resulting in conflict and
violence.
Several anthropologists have proposed mechanistic metaphors to characterise
aspects of the compensation process in Papua New Guinea. Filer (1997:189) suggests
that compensation discourse ‘functions like a thermostat which measures and controls
the heat or friction generated by the differential local impact of [resource develop-
ment]’. He argued that economic responses to compensation claims cannot solve
problems that are inherently political, as ‘landowners are not interested in a “fair
price” for their resources, or a reasonable “trade-off” between financial and political
rewards, but seek to do away with every form of wealth or power which makes them
seem to be dependent or inferior in their relations with “their” developers’ (Filer 1997:
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package for the Lihir gold mine.
17 Emphasising the coercive elements of these claims, Filer (1997: 173) compared landowners seeking
compensation to the infamous raskals (criminals or gang members) who operate along the road
through the central highlands of Papua New Guinea, ‘There is less reason for developers to hope
that landowners demanding compensation are on their way to becoming petty landlords collecting
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182). Strathern (1999:188–9, 291, n.15) suggests that compensation is like a ‘universal
translator’ which, under certain circumstances, can convert anything into wealth.18
Whereas both of these analogies have their virtues, I suggest an alternative model,
which begins with the recognition that compensation implies an evaluation of the
property in question, although the strategy for calculating this value may differ
between the two parties. 
Significantly, it is not the compensation claim that establishes the value of the
property in question, but rather what is given in response, suggesting a relationship
that can easily become unbalanced. Instead of a thermostat (measuring conflict) or a
universal translator (converting property claims into money), imagine a pair of coun-
ters, representing the two parties to the compensation claim, which are expected to
interdigitate, but do not always properly interface. Sometimes they seem to be in sync
with one another (e.g. when compensation claims made by Lihirians and correspon-
ding offers from the mine are not substantially different), so that their operation
appears to be the same on both sides. On other occasions, however, one of the coun-
ters may rotate slowly or not at all (e.g. when it was determined that pollution from
the mine did not kill the pigs from Putput and therefore the mine owed nothing to
their owners), while its counterpart spins rapidly (e.g. the unrelenting demands for
compensation for their pigs from the Putput landowners), failing to find the comp-
lementary notch (or point of compromise) that would bring the two sides back into
sync. At this point, the gorgor is the spanner thrown into the works that stops the
process, allowing for recalibration. 
Obviously each of these imaginary machines (the thermostat, the universal trans-
lator and the interconnected counters) models a different aspect of the compensation
process. But I will stay with the metaphor of the two counters, sometimes in phase
with each other, while at other times wildly out of sync, because it enables me to make
an important point that has not been given sufficient attention in the literature to date.
To understand the relationship between the two parties in compensation claims
requires sensitivity to differences in the production of value in property and transac-
tion regimes, as the third and final example from Lihir illustrates. 
Mor tuary exchange on Lihir 
The pigs raised by the villagers from Putput were intended for transactions associated
with inter-clan feasts held for major life-cycle events, of which mortuary rituals are the
most significant. The value of the pigs distributed at these feasts may be calculated in
terms of strings of shells known as mis in Tok Pisin. According to Martha Macintyre
(n.d.), the production and distribution of both pigs and shells has increased signifi-
cantly with the influx of cash from the mine. Macintyre described mis as ‘genuine shell
currency’ comparable to Tolai tambu: it is divisible, used in everyday and ritual con-
texts, and functions as a standard across competing spheres of exchange. 
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18 Strathern (1999: 188) described compensation as ‘refer[ring] both to the payment owed to persons
and to procedures by which they come to negotiate settlement. It can thus cover recompense due
to kin for nurture they have bestowed, as in bridewealth, as well as damages, as in reparations to
equalise thefts or injuries. It can substitute for a life, in homicide compensation, or for loss of
resources. Car fatalities, war reparations, mining royalties: all potentially fall under its rubric . . .
Liabilities and claims are defined by the positions parties take in relation to one another over the
issues of compensation itself’.
Macintyre (n.d.) also observed that Lihirians increasingly travel to New Ireland to
buy pigs at inflated values. On Lihir, producing pigs from cash is now an effective sub-
stitute for raising pigs oneself. Whereas being a ‘big man’ was once synonymous with
owning many pigs, big men now compel workers to purchase animals on their behalf.
She noted that: 
Lihirians will travel to Tanga or Tabar or Namatanai and pay up to K1,000 (and numerous mis)
for a pig that would cost less than half that on Lihir. The pig is usually large . . . but often indis-
tinguishable from others acquired for less. At the feast this pig will be given and its very high cash
value made known, so that the counter prestation will have to involve a pig that has been pur-
chased for the same amount of money and mis. The economic ‘irrationality’ of this trend is not
conceded.19 
The expenses required to procure pigs from other islands greatly inflates their value.
Yet one’s entire investment is measured in the subsequent transaction. In other words,
it takes more than a pig of comparable worth to provide an equivalent exchange, it
requires a comparable investment. Macintyre referred to this as ‘irrational’ or non-
economic. 
Mortuary feasts on Lihir account for the value placed on pigs above and beyond
their economic worth and for local engagement in non-economic forms of exchange. 
C. A. Gregory (1997: 56) has analysed a sequence of transactions that preceded a
Trobriand funerary ritual in which income earned from the sale of carvings to tourists
is transferred into the realm of gift exchange: ‘This roundabout way of acquiring a gift
keeps the alien world of commodities at bay, not by erecting a cordon sanitaire around
the island, but by providing a means by which commodities can become domesticated
into gifts’. The same logic applies on Lihir: while accepting the monetisation of daily
life associated with the mine, they reject the application of these values to mortuary
exchange, which threatens to transform their rituals into monetary assessments of the
value of human life. Foster (1995: 248) made a comparable claim regarding neigh-
bouring Tangans in respect of the strict separation they maintain between mortuary
ritual and commerce: ‘The distinction between kastom and bisnis in Tanga was the
result of a confluence of historical factors. But it was also the result of a perceived
incompatibility of commodity production and the processes of social reproduction
that they underpin’. 
The pigs exchanged by Lihirians at their feasts can be described as embodying a
series of transactions or a network of social relations. Lihirians measure relations with
one another through pigs and what is being evaluated is the work and agency that is
required to bring a pig to the feast, or today to produce pigs in the context of new
social and economic conditions associated with the mine. This takes the form of social
networks that are in effect contained within the pigs. 
An analogy can be made between these exchanges and compensation claims made
against the mine. When Lihirians claim compensation from the mine for one of their
pigs, they also seek recompense for the network of social relations embodied in the
animal. Compensation payments should adequately address their work and agency in
producing the pig in addition to potential relationships (also contained within the
pigs) that have been abrogated. In the Putput example, the manner in which the pigs
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19 Macintyre (n.d.) indicates that these payments can be seen as a means of redistributing cash from
wage earners and the recipients of royalty payments to persons with less access to cash. 
died invoked a series of events (including their relocation by the mine, problems with
the land on which they grazed their pigs etc.) that were also embodied in these ani-
mals. In seeking compensation for their pigs, Lihirians brought these (otherwise con-
cealed) networks into view. 
Conclusions: proper ty, compensation and the value of
human life 
Compensation claims on Lihir provide an informative context through which to eval-
uate the debate between Marilyn Strathern and Bruno Latour regarding social net-
works. Latour overlooked relations of power among people who occupy different
nodes along a network; Euro-American claims of ownership work (in part) by cutting
networks short, whereas compensation claims in Melanesia typically bring social
relationships into view. It is important to note, however, that these are relative
emphases rather than essential differences; as the disputes over compensation for pigs
killed along the road in Lihir illustrate, either party may (temporarily) favour exclu-
sivity over incorporation. 
Whereas Strathern depicted these networks in social terms, as persons and their
extended parts which take the form of objects, Latour emphasised their heterogeneity.20
That these networks incorporate a range of persons, things and ideas may account for
the failure of (relatively narrow) scientific explanations to satisfy many Papua New
Guineans about the environmental impact of mining projects. The length of social net-
works on Lihir is also evident in the transactions associated with their mortuary feasts.
The value of the pigs given in mortuary rituals represents the work and agency required
to produce pigs through monetary relations in the new world created around the mine.
In all of the examples presented here, however, it is instructive to think of pigs on Lihir
not only in terms of their monetary value, but also as embodying the social networks
through which they were produced and the possibility of future relationships.
To expand on the comparison of ownership claims in property and transaction
regimes, I return to Pietz’s (1997) analysis of nineteenth-century reforms of British
legal categories associated with property, compensation and the value of human life.
How do new economic forms like railways and mines influence the way that property
and ownership are defined? Pietz (1997: 100) notes that the new technologies of the
industrial revolution increased the frequency of accidents as the unintended conse-
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20 Gell (1998: 222–3) provided an elegant summary of M. Strathern’s (1988) position on the ‘distrib-
uted person’: ‘[If] we try to give an account of the external aspect of persons, we find that any one
social individual is the sum of their relations (distributed over biographical time and space) with
other persons. Our inner personhood seems to consist of replications of what we are externally . . .
So, bearing this in mind, it may not be so aberrant to suggest that what persons are externally (and
collectively) is a kind of enlarged replication of what they are internally. [We can] consider “per-
sons” not as bounded biological organisms, but use this label to apply to all the objects and/or
events in the milieu from which agency or personhood can be abducted. Seen in this light, a person
and a person’s mind are not confined to particular spatio-temporal co-ordinates, but consist of a
spread of biographical events and memories of events, and a dispersed category of material objects,
traces, and leavings, which can be attributed to a person and which, in aggregate, testify to agency
and [personhood] during a biographical career which may, indeed, prolong itself long after bio-
logical death. The person is thus understood as the sum total of the indexes which testify, in a life
and subsequently, to the biographic existence of this or that individual’.
quences of mechanical operation. The resulting injuries (and sometimes deaths) estab-
lished new monetary relations between corporations and individuals. 
Both prior to and after the abolition of the deodand, the social networks associ-
ated with compensation payments for railway accidents were limited in length. In the
first instance, the value of compensation was arbitrarily fixed by the ‘value of the
[material] instrument of injury’, i.e. the ox that gored or the cart that overturned. The
deodand was in part a solution to the problem of compensation without activating any
of the relevant social networks. It was rescinded when its costs became prohibitive,
raising new questions of scale in relation to the respective values of technology and
human life. The legal substitute for the deodand (compensation payments based on the
loss of potential earnings) failed to engage with questions about the safety of the tech-
nology employed or the added risks that might be incurred from the pressure to keep
the trains to schedule. The relatively new notion of limited liability for corporations
also shortened the social networks that might otherwise have been invoked in the
event of an injury or death. 
The examples from Lihir present a valuable point of comparison with the railway
accidents analysed by Pietz. His essay referred to people who were killed by locomo-
tives, compensation payments calculated by the insurance industry and the reduction
of social networks. The examples from Lihir involve pigs killed in road accidents and
by poor grazing conditions, compensation payments negotiated under the threat of
gorgor and references to wider social networks. While the decision to abolish the deo-
dand eased the way for trains (and capital) to circulate unimpeded, the unsynchronised
‘counters’ of Lihirian compensation claims are the result of different strategies of own-
ership and alternative ways of calculating value. 
In an essay on colonialism in the Papuan Highlands, Eric Hirsch (1999: 825) drew
attention to a related contrast between Australian colonial attempts to ‘discipline the
social and material world so that it renders discrete units for administrative efficacy
and authority’ and how the Fuyuge ‘perceive relatively little value in the reproduc-
tion of discrete units with individual identity’. Similarly, conflicts between Lihirians
and the mine reflect fundamental differences in how the two parties conceptualise
value.
Pietz (1997: 104) has shown how fatal accidents and legal reforms combined to
establish novel debt liabilities and new monetary values, illustrating that ‘death, the
destruction of life, the very antithesis of an economically productive event, sometimes
creates money’. The reform of the deodand produced new relationships between
money and people: it established a monetary value for human life. Pietz (1997: 108)
explains how this monetary value is experienced: 
Capitalism can fully establish itself as the structuring system of a social reality only to the extent
that monetary debt in this sense becomes a practical logic and ‘felt necessity’ in everyday social
interactions. It may be that the historical limits of capitalist relations appear in those traumatic
events that fall outside the economic realm of commercial exchange and contractual agreement,
but whose material impact on individual human lives, in cases of accidental injury, and on whole
peoples, in the form of war, nevertheless valorise new debt relations that the modern social order
must somehow realise in the form of monetary value. 
While nineteenth-century British law established a new monetary value for human
life, Lihirians have an alternative institution that accounts for the value of human life:
mortuary feasts in which the pigs that are exchanged measure the (social) worth of the
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deceased.21 By rejecting the application of monetary (or commodity) logic to the
objects that circulate in their mortuary rituals, Lihirians reject the monetary value of
human life.22
In order to understand the relationship between property, compensation and the
value of human life, one may examine the historical transformations of monetary
value, as Pietz does for nineteenth-century Britain, or the meeting point of alternative
systems of value (what I refer to as property and transaction regimes). A key differ-
ence in how these values are realised is the respective strategies of ownership
employed in each case, mobilising networks that vary in length. The way in which
ownership claims are formulated affects other social categories, including the narrow-
ness with which scientific problems may be defined and how one measures the value
of life. These ‘property effects’ are of considerable interest and import, whether they
refer to compensation for railway accidents in nineteenth-century Britain or pigs des-
tined for mortuary feasts in Lihir which are accidentally killed along the road built by
the mine. 
Finally, I return to property and transaction regimes as an alternative to the dis-
tinction between gifts and commodities. An analysis formulated in terms of gifts and
commodities might emphasise Lihirian resistance to the commodification of pigs (and
of social life more generally).23 But the dispute between Lihirians and the mine is not
simply about the standing of these objects (the pigs) as gifts or commodities. What is at
stake is the character of the social networks organised through these modes of
exchange. Where social reproduction is carried out through transactions – in contradis-
tinction to property relations which emphasise consumption rather than circulation –
there may be resistance to the shortening of social networks rather than commodifica-
tion per se. I do not dispute that Lihirians seek to maximise their returns from the mine
in the form of compensation, but I argue that they also seek to protect the capacity of
their mortuary feasts to measure the value of life in terms of other human relationships.
Whereas property claims generally reduce the length of the networks involved, these
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21 Note that Foster (1995: 170; emphasis removed), following M. Strathern, described exchange in
Melanesia as ‘a process in which agents construct particular differences (or similarities) relative to
each other – instead of the equal value or equivalence of their object – through the circulation of
specific items in specific contexts’. 
22 Another way to put this is that the measure of life cannot be money, which cannot reproduce itself
in the same way that pigs and shells do in a Melanesian context, an assertion that is strikingly similar
to feudal claims about money (see Pietz 1997: 102–3). As Foster (1995: 224) noted, ‘Mortuary feast-
ing . . . is nothing less than the alternation of life and death, the transformation of one into the other’.
23 Strathern and Stewart (1998: 58) have argued that ‘pigs [in Hagen] are not fully commoditized: their
status as substitutes for human life remains intact because they have no place in the outside system other
than as an occasional trading resource’. They also note (p. 63) that ‘Compensation practices recognize
the substitutability of wealth for the person, and contemporary problems reveal the incipient commod-
ificationof theperson-bodycomplexresultingfromtheeffectsofmonetizationintheeconomyat large’.
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